Vídeo electoral de Reagrupament independentista

4-07-1976, Entebbe

Avui fa 34 anys que va tenir lloc la gesta del rescat d'Entebbe per les forces israelianes.

Fèlix Pons, in memoriam

Aquesta foto correspon a la manifestació del Primer de Maig de 1979, a Palma, al seu pas per la plaça de Cort. Els manifestants es varen aturar davant l'Ajuntament, el qual era governat per un pacte d'esquerres des de feia deu dies.
Els comunistes del PCE no alçaven el puny, el del MCI sí que ho feia; els socialistes, excepte Fèlix Pons, també l'alçaven. Aquesta foto expressa com era el moment polític. Com es pot veure, Fèlix Pons és l'únic que duia corbata.
La foto va ser publicada a la portada del dia 2-05-1979 del diari Última Hora.
Al cel sia.

Sobre el dret de secessió

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion)
Harold Hongju Koh
The Legal Adviser, United States Department of State
December 8, 2009
1. Mr. President, Honorable members of the Court:
It is a great honor to appear before you today on behalf of the United States of America, a nation born of a declaration of independence more than two centuries ago, to urge this Court to leave undisturbed the declaration of independence of the people of Kosovo.
2. The United States appears today as a friend of both Serbia and Kosovo. The people of the United States share a bond of friendship with the people of Serbia marked by cooperation in two world wars and longstanding political and economic ties that date back at least to the bilateral Treaty of Commerce of 1881. Our relationship with the people of Kosovo, strengthened through crisis these last two decades, continues to grow. That said, our sole task today is to address the narrow legal question before this Court.
3. Over the past week, those pleading before you have discussed a broad range of issues, including the validity of recognitions of Kosovo, the effectiveness of the United Nations, the legality of military actions in 1999, and the potential responsibility of non-state actors for internationally wrongful acts. Yet the precise question put to this Court is much narrower: ―Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?‖ The answer to that question, we submit, is yes. For as a general matter, international law does not regulate declarations of independence,
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nor is there anything about Kosovo‘s particular declaration that would render it not ―in accordance with international law.‖1 Standing alone, a declaration neither constitutes nor establishes political independence; it announces a political reality or aspiration that must then be achieved by other means. Declaring independence is fundamentally an act of popular will—a political act, made by a body politic, which other states then decide whether to recognize or not.2
4. To say that international law does not generally authorize or prohibit declarations of independence signals no lack of respect either for international law or the work of this Court. Rather, such a statement merely recognizes that international law does not regulate every human event, and that an important measure of human liberty is the freedom of a people to conduct their own affairs. In many cases, including Kosovo‘s, the terms of a declaration of independence can mark a new nation‘s fundamental respect for international law. As our own Declaration put it, a ―decent respect to the Opinions of Mankind‖ dictates ―that facts be submitted to a candid world.‖ Of the more than 100 declarations of independence issued by more than half of the countries in the world,3 we know of none that has been held by an international court to violate international law. We submit that this Court should not choose Kosovo‘s declaration of independence as the first case for such unprecedented judicial treatment. Few declarations can match the political legitimacy of Kosovo‘s peaceful declaration, which issued from a body representing the will of the people, was born of a successful, decade-long UN effort to bring peace and security to the Balkans region, and reflected the capacity of the people of Kosovo to govern themselves. As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, this Court should decline the invitation to undo
1 Written Statement of the United States of America (―U.S. Statement‖), pp. 50-55. 2 Id. pp. 51-52. 3 David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History 3, 20 (2007).
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the hard work of so many other parts of the UN system, potentially destabilizing the situation and unraveling the gains so painstakingly achieved under Resolution 1244.4 5. Mr. President: A careful consideration of the pleadings before this Court compels three conclusions, which will structure the rest of my presentation: First, Kosovo‘s declaration of independence brought a necessary and stabilizing end to a turbulent chapter in the history of the Western Balkans, and made possible a transition to a common European future for the people of Kosovo and their neighbors. The real question this Court faces is whether to support re-opening of this tragic past or whether instead to let Kosovo and Serbia look forward to this more promising future. Second, as a legal matter, there is no inconsistency between Kosovo‘s peaceful declaration of independence and principles of international law, including Security Council Resolution 1244. Like others attending these proceedings who participated in these historic events, I attended the Rambouillet negotiations as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and observed the great pains taken to respect international law and to preserve human rights throughout the lengthy diplomatic negotiations that led to Resolution 1244, and ultimately to Kosovo‘s Declaration. We respectfully submit that a Security Council resolution drafted with such an intent did not give birth to a declaration of independence that violates international law.
Third, and finally, we question whether this case—which involves an unprecedented referral of a narrow, anomalous question—marks an appropriate occasion for this Court to exercise its advisory jurisdiction. But should the Court decide that it must render an advisory opinion, the Court would best be served by answering that
4 See Written Comments of the United States of America (―U.S. Comments‖), pp. 3-4.
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narrow question in the affirmative: that Kosovo's declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. I. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence 6. Mr. President, you have now heard many times the story of Kosovo‘s declaration of independence and the trauma from which it was born. That declaration was the product of not one, but three overlapping historical processes, which did not preordain Kosovo‘s declaration, but do help to explain it —the disintegration of Yugoslavia; the human rights crisis within Kosovo; and the United Nations‘ response.
7. First, from the Bosnia case, this Court knows well the painful story of the Yugoslav process: the rise of Serb nationalism in the 1980s, followed by the breakup first of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S.F.R.Y.) in 1991-92, then of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) more than a decade later. You know of the successive independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and finally, of Kosovo. 5
8. Second, you have heard about Kosovo’s internal process: the grim, well-chronicled background of atrocities and ethnic cleansing; how the people of Kosovo suffered years of exclusion from public facilities and offices; how some 10,000 people were killed in state-sponsored violence, how one million people were driven from the territory, and how the people of Kosovo developed self-government over nearly ten years of separation from Belgrade. You know of the drastic escalation of oppression by Belgrade in the late 1990s; of the atrocities that were recorded by the United Nations and human rights organizations; of the unsuccessful attempt to achieve a solution acceptable to both Serbia and Kosovo at Rambouillet; of the brutal
5 See U.S. Statement, pp. 8-9, 77-78.
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campaign of ethnic cleansing launched by Belgrade against ethnic Albanians in the spring of 1999; and of the eventual adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999.6
9. Third, the declaration at issue did not happen spontaneously; it emerged only after an extended United Nations process, in which a United Nations administration focused on developing Kosovo‘s self-governing institutions, and a sustained UN mediation effort exhausted all available avenues for a mutually agreed solution, before finally concluding—in Martti Ahtisaari‘s words—that ―the only viable option for Kosovo is independence.‖7
10. By adopting Resolution 1244, the Security Council sought to create a framework to promote two goals. The first was to protect the people of Kosovo, by building an interim environment where they would be protected by an international security presence—the NATO-led KFOR—and where they could develop political institutions free from Belgrade‘s coercion under an international civil presence in the form of UNMIK.8 Second, the Resolution authorized the international civil presence to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo‘s future status, but only at a later stage.9
11. This UN umbrella and game plan provided critical breathing space for Kosovo to stabilize and develop effective Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG): an elected assembly, a president, a prime minister, ministries and a judiciary.10 UNMIK steadily devolved authority to those Kosovo institutions, allowing the people of Kosovo to rule themselves free
6 See ibid., pp. 8-22. 7 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo‘s Future Status, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007, para. 5 (emphasis added) [Dossier No. 203]; see also U.S. Statement, pp. 22-32. 8 See U.S. Statement, pp. 19-20. 9 See ibid., pp. 20-21. 10 See ibid., p. 23.
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from Belgrade‘s influence.11 In 2005, the Secretary-General‘s Special Envoy Kai Eide found the status quo unsustainable, which led the UN Security Council to launch a political process, led by Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, to determine Kosovo‘s future status.12 But after many months of intensive negotiations involving all interested parties, Special Envoy Ahtisaari concluded in March 2007: (1) that even with autonomy, Kosovo‘s reintegration with Serbia was ―simply not tenable‖; (2) that continuing interim administration without resolving Kosovo‘s future status risked instability; and (3) that further efforts to find common ground between Kosovo and Serbia were futile.13 In Mr. Ahtisaari‘s words, ―the negotiations‘ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo‘s status is exhausted,‖ and ―[n]o amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.‖14 Going forward, the Envoy concluded, ―the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community.‖15
12. While some in these proceedings have questioned the integrity and impartiality of the Special Envoy, a most distinguished Nobel Laureate, the Secretary-General confirmed his full support for the Special Envoy‘s recommendation, having himself ―taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo‘s future status.‖16 The entire Contact
11 See ibid., p. 24. 12 See ibid., pp. 25-26. 13 See Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo‘s Future Status, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007, paras. 3-9, 16 [Dossier No. 203]. 14 Ibid., paras. 3, 5. 15 Ibid., para. 3 (emphasis added). 16 See Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, attaching Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo‘s Future State, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007 [Dossier No. 203]; see also U.S. Statement, p. 30.
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Group ―endorsed fully the United Nations Secretary-General‘s assessment that the status quo is not sustainable.‖17 And the Council of the European Union—including even those members who would later decline to recognize Kosovo‘s independence—expressed its ―full support‖ for the Special Envoy and ―his efforts in conducting the political process to determine Kosovo‘s future status.‖18
13. Nevertheless, a ―Troika‖ of senior negotiators was charged to make a last-ditch effort to find a negotiated solution.19 According to its report, the Troika ―left no stone unturned in trying to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Kosovo status question.‖20 But when those Troika talks also reached an impasse, Kosovo‘s elected leaders consulted widely and on February 17, 2008, issued their declaration pronouncing Kosovo ―an independent and sovereign state.‖21
14. Like many declarations of independence, Kosovo‘s declaration was a general manifesto, published to all the world, that affirmed the new state‘s commitments as a member of the international community. The declaration accepted the obligations in the Ahtisaari Plan, and announced Kosovo‘s desire for friendship and cooperation with Serbia and all states.22
17 Letter dated 10 December 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2007/723, 10 December 2007, Annex 3 (Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers, New York, 27 September 2007) [Dossier No. 209].
18 Council of the European Union, 2756th External Relations Council Meeting of 16-17 October 2006, para. 6, available at http://www.westernbalkans.info/upload/docs/91337.pdf. 19 See U.S. Statement, p. 31. 20 Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, Annex 5 (Letter of 5 December 2007 from German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger to European Union High Representative Javier Solana). 21 See U.S. Statement, pp. 32-33. 22 See Declaration of Independence [Docket No. 192]; U.S. Statement, pp. 33, 56-57.
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15. Today, nearly two years later, we see that the declaration of independence was the ultimate product of all three processes I have described: it brought closure to Yugoslavia‘s disintegration; it enshrined human rights protections for all communities within Kosovo; and it broke the impasse in the United Nations process. Yesterday, counsel for Cyprus colorfully but inaptly suggested that the United Nations Security Council was involved in the ―amputation‖ of Kosovo and the ―dismemberment‖ of Serbia. But Cyprus never mentioned that Kosovo became independent not because of unilateral, brutal U.N. action, but through the interaction between a U.N. process that helped end brutality, and the parallel processes of Yugoslavia‘s disintegration and increasing Kosovo self-governance. 16. The simple fact is that Resolution 1244 worked. Without preordaining, it permitted Kosovo‘s independence. Kosovo is now both independent and functioning effectively. Kosovo has been recognized by 63 nations, and all but one of its immediate neighbors, including former Yugoslav Republics Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. No fewer than 115 of the world‘s countries have treated Kosovo as a state, by either formally recognizing it or voting for its admission to international financial institutions. And the 2008 declaration of independence has opened the way for a new European future for the people both of Kosovo and the wider Balkans region. II. Legal Arguments 17. Mr. President, against this reality, Serbia now seeks an opinion by this Court that would turn back time, although doing so would undermine the progress and stability that Kosovo‘s declaration has brought to the region. As a legal matter, this Court should find that Serbia‘s desired outcome is dictated neither by general principles of international law, nor by Security Council Resolution 1244.
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A. General International Law
18. As we detailed in our written pleadings, Kosovo‘s declaration of independence declared a political aspiration, which cannot by itself violate international law. General international law does not as a general matter prohibit or authorize declarations of independence.23 Other nations accept or reject the legitimacy of a declaration of independence by their willingness or refusal to treat the entity as a state: that test only confirms the legitimacy of Kosovo‘s declaration here. But without citing any authority, Serbia asks the Court to adopt the opposite, sweeping rule: when territory has not been illegally annexed, Serbia claims, the international law principle of territorial integrity prohibits all nonconsensual secessions (and a fortiori, all declarations of independence), except where domestic law grants a right of secession or the parent state accepts the declaration before or soon after the secession.24 Yet as our written filings establish, no such general international law rule bars declarations of independence, nor can there be such ad hoc exceptions to a general rule that does not exist.25
23 See Malcolm Shaw, ―Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996,‖ in Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, p. 136 (Anne Bayefsky, ed. 2000) (―It is true that the international community is very cautious about secessionist attempts, especially when the situation is such that threats to international peace and security are manifest. Nevertheless, as a matter of law the international system neither authorises nor condemns such attempts, but rather stands neutral. Secession, as such, therefore, is not contrary to international law.‖); John Dugard & David Raič, ―The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Secession,‖ in Secession: International Law Perspectives, p. 102 (Marcelo Kohen, ed. 2006) (―One will search in vain for an explicit prohibition of unilateral secession in international instruments. The same is true for the explicit recognition of such a right.‖); Daniel Thürer, ―Secession‖, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed.) available at http://www.mpepil.com, p. 2 (―International law, thus, does not state conditions of legality of a secession, and neither does it provide for a general ‗right of secession‘. It does not in general condemn movements aiming at the acquisition of independence, either.‖); see generally U.S. Statement, pp. 50-55; U.S. Comments, pp. 13-14. 24 Written Statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (―Serbia Statement‖), para. 943. 25 See U.S. Written Comments, pp. 13-20; see also U.S. Written Statement, pp. 50-55.
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19. To see that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence simply because they were issued without the parent state‘s consent, one need look no further than Yugoslavia itself, where the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence initiated Yugoslavia‘s breakup in 1991. When those declarations issued, Belgrade also declared, wrongly, that both declarations violated both Yugoslav and international law. But today, even Belgrade no longer makes those claims. To the contrary, Serbia now asserts that Slovenia‘s and Croatia‘s secessions were lawful under international law because they were permitted under Yugoslav domestic law, although Belgrade took precisely the opposite position at the time.26 In reversing its position, Belgrade nowhere explains how the international law rule in this area can turn on a question of domestic law that the international community cannot knowledgeably evaluate. The second ad hoc exception that Serbia offers—that a parent state can make lawful an unlawful declaration by later acceptance—conflicts with its own arguments in these proceedings: that the illegality of a declaration cannot be cured by subsequent events.
20. Neither did Kosovo‘s declaration violate the general principle of territorial integrity. That basic principle calls upon states to respect the territorial integrity of other states. But it does not regulate the internal conduct of groups within states, or preclude such internal groups from seceding or declaring independence.27 Citing Security Council resolutions, Serbia claims
26 Compare Written Comments of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (―Serbia Comments‖), para. 201 (―With regard to domestic law, some constitutions provide for a right to secession, as it was the case of the S.F.R.Y., only with regard to the six constituent nations‖), with Stands and Conclusions of the S.F.R.Y. Presidency Concerning the Situation in Yugoslavia, 27 June 1991 (reprinted in Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution (Snezana Tifunovska, ed. 1994), p. 305 (describing the Slovenian and Croatian declarations as ―anti-constitutional and unilateral acts lacking legality and legitimacy on the internal and external plane‖).
27 See Georges Abi-Saab, ―Conclusion‖, in Secession: International Law Perspectives, p. 474 (Marcelo Kohen, ed. 2006) (―[I]t would be erroneous to say that secession violates the principle of territorial integrity of the State, since this principle applies only in international relations, i.e. against other States that are required to respect that integrity
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that the obligation to respect territorial integrity also regulates non-state actors and precludes them from declaring independence, whether peacefully or not. But none of the resolutions it cites supports that claim.28 We do not deny that international law may regulate particular declarations of independence, if they are conjoined with illegal uses of force or violate other peremptory norms, such as the prohibition against apartheid. But that is hardly the case here, where those declaring independence did not violate peremptory norms. In fact, Kosovo‘s declaration makes such a deep commitment to respect human rights precisely because the people of Kosovo had experienced such egregious human rights abuses. B. Resolution 1244
21. Mr. President, Kosovo‘s declaration of independence comports not just with general rules of international law, but also with Resolution 1244, which—as our written submissions detail—anticipated, without predetermining, that independence might be an appropriate outcome for Kosovo‘s future status.29
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court: If you look with me at the text of Resolution 1244, you will see that it was overwhelmingly driven by the Council‘s overriding concern for resolving the humanitarian and human rights tragedy occurring in Kosovo. It demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ―put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo‖ by beginning a verifiable phased withdrawal of security forces on a timetable
and not encroach on the territory of their neighbours; it does not apply within the State.‖); Malcolm Shaw, ―Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996,‖ in Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, p. 136 (Anne Bayefsky, ed. 2000) (―[I]t must be recognized that international law places no analogous obligation [of respect for territorial integrity] upon individuals or groups within states. The provisions contained in the relevant international instruments bind states parties to them and not persons and peoples within states.‖); see generally U.S. Comments, pp. 15-20. 28 See U.S. Comments, pp. 18-20. 29 See U.S. Statement, pp. 68-79; U.S. Comments, pp. 24-34.
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synchronized with the phased insertion of an international security presence.30 Paragraphs 10 and 11 authorize the establishment of an international civil presence to ―[f]acilitat[e] a political process designed to determine Kosovo‘s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords.‖31
23. Serbia claims that 1244‘s explicit reference to Rambouillet ―clearly adopt[ed] the principle of the continued territorial integrity and sovereignty of the F.R.Y. over Kosovo.‖32 But at the time, Serbia claimed just the opposite: calling the Rambouillet Accords an ―unprecedented attempt to impose a solution clearly endorsing the separatists‘ objectives.‖33 This is not surprising, because as you heard yesterday from Denmark, a prime objective at Rambouillet was to respect the will of the people of Kosovo. That is why, as we have seen, Rambouillet carefully avoided pre-determining any particular political outcome, on the one hand, neither favoring independence, but on the other hand, never ruling that possibility out.
24. Nor did anything in Resolution 1244‘s description of the future status process give Serbia a veto over a future Kosovo declaration of independence.34 To the contrary, the Rambouillet Accords, to which Resolution 1244 refers, rejected any requirement that the F.R.Y. consent to Kosovo‘s future status.35 In the negotiations over the Accords—and the four so-called ―Hill Agreements‖ upon which Rambouillet was modeled—the negotiators rejected any
30 See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, para. 3 [Dossier No. 34]. 31 Ibid., paras. 10, 11. 32 Serbia Statement, para. 784; see also Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record (―Verbatim Record‖), 1 December 2009, Statement of Mr. Shaw for Serbia, para. 24. 33 See U.S. Statement, pp. 16-17, 65. 34 See U.S. Comments, pp. 32-37. 35 See U.S. Statement, pp. 65-68.
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requirement that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consent before Kosovo‘s future status could be finally determined.36 As Professor Murphy explained last Tuesday, the first three drafts of the Hill Agreements would have required the F.R.Y.‘s express agreement to change Kosovo‘s status at the end of the interim period. But in the fourth draft of the Hill Agreement, that language was placed in brackets, and no similar requirement for Belgrade‘s approval of future status appeared in the final version of either the Rambouillet Accords or Resolution 1244.
25. Some have claimed during these oral proceedings that the reference in the preamble of Resolution 1244 to the ―territorial integrity‖ of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proved that the Security Council was foreclosing independence as a possible outcome. During these proceedings, one state that sat on the Security Council at the time suggested that all states understood Resolution 1244 to guarantee permanently the F.R.Y.‘s ―territorial integrity.‖37 But if that were true, why did the F.R.Y. protest at the time that the resolution ―opens up the possibility of the secession of Kosovo … from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia‖?38 And why did nine of the states that were on the Council when it adopted resolution 1244 – Bahrain, Canada, France, Gambia, Malaysia, Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States – later recognize Kosovo, if they had already supposedly voted for a resolution that permanently prohibited its independence?
26. What Serbia‘s argument leaves out is the telling silence in Resolution 1244, the dog that did not bark. Resolution 1244 said absolutely nothing about the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia beyond the interim period. Unlike the previous UN Security
36 See ibid. 37 Verbatim Record, 2 December 2009, Statement of Ms. Ruiz Cerutti for Argentina, para. 12. 38 Remarks of Mr. Jovanović, Chargé d‘affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, in Security Council debate on adoption of resolution 1244, S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999, p. 6 [Dossier No. 33].
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Council resolutions on Kosovo, Resolution 1244 qualifies its reference to territorial integrity with the phrase ―as set out in Annex 2.‖ But Annex 2 refers to territorial integrity only in paragraph 8, which in turn describes only the political framework agreement that will cover the interim period. And while the text of 1244 reaffirms the commitment of the ―member states‖—not internal groups—to the territorial integrity of the F.R.Y., even this it does only during the interim period, without limiting the options for future status.39
27. As important, the resolution refers not to preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia, but the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an entity that no longer exists.40 Even though the Resolution required Kosovo to remain within the F.R.Y., it never required Kosovo to remain within ―Serbia.‖ To the contrary, as we have explained, the resolution specifically avoided any such implication, to preserve the possibility of what were called at the time ―third republic options,‖ under which Kosovo might end up as a third republic inside the borders of a three-republic F.R.Y., alongside Serbia and Montenegro.41
28. 1244‘s reference to territorial integrity was further qualified by the Resolution‘s explicit reference, in preambular paragraph 10, not just to Annex 2 (which applied only during the interim period), but also to the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki reference underscored the Security Council‘s overriding humanitarian concern with protecting civilians, by keeping
39 See U.S. Statement, pp. 68-71; U.S. Comments, pp. 25-29. 40 No one is challenging that Serbia is the legal continuity of the F.R.Y., but the law of state succession does not mean that all references in international documents to a parent are automatically considered to apply to a continuation state. See U.S. Comments, p. 29. 41 See U.S. Statement, pp. 74-78; U.S. Comments, pp. 29-31. Our Written Comments describe Belgrade‘s desire to avoid this possibility. Belgrade called such proposals ―the most perfidious fraud Serbia has ever been exposed to.‖ U.S. Comments, pp. 30-31.
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Kosovo detached from the Serbia that had so harshly oppressed them.42 Kosovo had famously suffered massive, systematic human rights abuses throughout the decade, which led the F.R.Y. to be suspended from participation in the OSCE. Thus, 1244‘s pointed reference to the Helsinki Final Act underscored that the Council was reaffirming the F.R.Y.‘s territorial integrity, not as an absolute principle, but as only one of many principles (including most obviously, Helsinki human rights commitments) that needed to be considered, each principle—in the Final Act‘s words—being interpreted taking into account the others.‖43
29. Serbia and its supporters never specify precisely which words in Resolution 1244 they believe that Kosovo violated. But some suggest that Kosovo violated international law by preventing UNMIK from carrying out its mandate under Paragraph 11(e) ―to facilitate a political process‖ designed to determine Kosovo‘s future status. But that paragraph required only that the international civilian presence facilitate ―a‖ political process—not multiple political processes.44 By the time that Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, the specific political process envisioned by Resolution 1244 had ended. The future status process had run its course and the negotiations‘ potential to produce any mutually agreed outcome on Kosovo‘s status had been exhausted. With the Secretary-General‘s support, the Special Envoy—who was charged with determining the scope and duration of the political process—had announced that ―[n]o amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse,‖ and the Envoy had specifically declared that the only viable option for Kosovo was independence.
42 See U.S. Statement, pp. 71-74. 43 Helsinki Final Act, 1 August 1975, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf. 44 See U.S. Comments, pp. 32, 36.
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30. In these proceedings, some argue that the effort by some states, including the United States, to secure a new Security Council resolution on Kosovo in July 200745 somehow proves that we considered a successor resolution to 1244 legally necessary for Kosovo to become independent. But like Resolution 1244, the draft 2007 resolution was entirely ―status-neutral.‖ Its central legal purpose was to terminate UNMIK‘s operations in Kosovo, as the Ahtisaari Plan had envisioned. Nothing in the draft resolution would have decided on, or even endorsed a recommendation for, Kosovo‘s independence. Its non-enactment meant only that adjustments would be needed in the roles of UNMIK and other international actors envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan. If anything, the success of that subsequent coordination only underscores the consistency of the declaration of independence with the operation of U.N. entities under Resolution 1244.
31. In short, by February 2008, the absence of any prospect of bridging the divide between Serbia and Kosovo had rendered any further negotiations pointless.46 In these proceedings, Serbia ironically charges Kosovo with bad faith, suggesting that Kosovo‘s position favoring independence in the negotiations is ―in sharp contrast‖ with 1244‘s requirement that ―the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia should be safeguarded.‖47 But neither UNMIK, Ahtisaari, nor the Troika ever suggested that Kosovo was negotiating in bad faith. Serbia claims that Kosovo did not need independence because Serbia had offered Kosovo the ―highest degree of autonomy‖ under Resolution 1244.48 But anyone who has read the factual
45 A draft of the resolution is attached as Exhibit 36 to Serbia‘s Statement. 46 U.S. Statement, pp. 79-84. 47 Serbia Statement, para. 919.
48 Verbatim Record, 1 December 2009, Statement of Mr. Zimmermann for Serbia, para. 46; Serbia Statement, para. 203.
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findings of the Trial Chamber in the Milutinovic case, who has seen photographs of Serbian tanks stationed outside the Kosovo Assembly building in March 1989, or who followed events in the Balkans during the past two decades, understands why the entire Contact Group identified Belgrade‘s ―disastrous policies of the past [as lying] at the heart of the current problems.‖49 It was Serbia, not Kosovo, that the Contact Group admonished ―to demonstrate much greater flexibility‖ and ―to begin considering reasonable and workable compromises.‖50
32. Nor would it establish any violation of international law to argue that the declaration of independence was an ultra vires act by the Kosovo Assembly.51 For even if it were true that issuing the declaration somehow exceeded the authority conferred on the Assembly by UNMIK under the Constitutional Framework, that would only amount to a claim that it was issued by the wrong persons in Pristina. But if the declaration were considered flawed because it issued from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, that technicality could now easily be fixed simply by having a different constituent body within Kosovo reissue it. No one doubts that the people of Kosovo wanted independence, or that their declaration expressed their will. The people of Kosovo declared independence not under a ―top-down‖ grant of domestic law authority from UNMIK, but rather, through a ―bottom-up‖ expression of the will of the people of Kosovo, who left no doubt of their desire for independence.
33. Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the declaration did somehow violate the Constitutional Framework, that Framework, like the other regulations adopted by
49 Statement by the Contact Group on the Future of Kosovo, London, 31 January 2006, available at http://pristina.usembassy.gov/press20060131a.html. 50 Contact Group Ministerial Statement, Vienna, 24 July 2006, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr /en/IMG/pdf/statement_Vienne_24_juillet_version_finale.pdf. 51 U.S. Statement, p.57 n.231; U.S. Comments, pp. 38-39.
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UNMIK, operated as domestic, not international, law.‖52 We have previously demonstrated that UNMIK regulations must be domestic law because they operated at the domestic level, replace existing laws, and regulate local matters.53 Serbia conceded the accuracy of this point, but argued that UNMIK rules somehow constitute international law because they were issued by the Security Council, an international authority.54 But just because the Security Council authorized UNMIK to establish Kosovo‘s domestic law did not automatically convert that domestic law into international law. For example, an automobile driver in Kosovo who might violate a speed limit in an UNMIK traffic regulation surely does not violate international law simply because the entity that promulgated the law against speeding was created by an international body.55
34. Mr. President, if there were ever a time when U.N. officials could have acted to set aside the declaration of independence, it was soon after that declaration issued in February 2008. But the responsible organs of the U.N. made a considered decision nearly two years ago not to invalidate that declaration of independence. They made that decision with full awareness of that declaration‘s specific acceptance of Resolution 1244 and the international presences established
52 UNMIK‘s grant of authority was to exercise ―legislative and executive powers‖—that is what it was doing when it promulgated Regulation 2001/9—and its responsibility was to ―change, repeal or suspend existing laws to the extent necessary for the carrying out of [its] functions. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999 [Dossier No. 37]. A contemporaneous 2001 commentary noted that Regulation 2001/9, the Constitutional Framework, assigns to the SRSG and KFOR ―the powers that are typically associated with a federal government.‖ A. Zimmerman and C. Stahn, Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State, 70 Nordic J. Intl L. 423, 428 (2001). 53 See U.S. Comments, pp. 39-42. 54 See Verbatim Record, 1 December 2009, Statement of Mr. Djeric for Serbia, paras. 39-41. 55 See U.S. Comments, pp. 39-42 and citations therein.
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by it, and Kosovo‘s pledge to act consistently with all Security Council resolutions and requirements of international law.56 III. The Court Should Answer Only the Narrow Question Posed 35. Finally, Mr. President, the Court should answer only the narrow question posed. What all this has demonstrated is just how anomalous and narrow is the question presented in this case. It is not a question about whether Kosovo is an independent state today, nor whether it has been properly recognized. Nor is this case about whether UNMIK and the United Nations should be doing anything differently. It is not about whether the U.N. institutions empowered to do so acted properly in declining to invalidate the declaration of independence nearly two years ago. Finally, it is not about whether Kosovo‘s future status talks—which were properly ended as ―exhausted‖ years ago—could or should now be resumed.
36. The usual premise upon which this Court‘s advisory jurisdiction rests is that the requesting organ—here, the General Assembly—needs the Court‘s legal advice to carry out its functions effectively.57 But here the question has been asked not to give the Assembly legal advice, so much as to give advice to member states.58 Resolution 63/3, which referred the advisory question to the Court, nowhere indicates how the Court‗s opinion would relate to any planned activity of the General Assembly nor does it identify any constructive use to which the
56 See U.S. Statement, pp. 84-89; U.S. Comments, pp. 43-45. 57 See U.S. Statement, pp. 42-45; U.S. Comments, pp. 10-12.
58 As this Court has emphasized in the past, advisory opinions serve to advise the organs of the United Nations, not individual member states. In seeking support for its Resolution, Serbia continually emphasized not the need of the General Assembly for an answer to the question, but the purported right of member states to refer a question to the Court. Serbia frankly described this case as being ―about the right of any member state of the United Nations to pose a simple, elementary question,‖ asserting before the General Assembly that ―[n]o country should be denied the right to refer such a matter to the ICJ‖; and that a vote against the resolution ―would in effect be a vote to deny the right of any country to seek—now or in the future—judicial recourse through the United Nations system.‖ See U.S. Statement, p. 44.
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Assembly might put a Court opinion. And unlike every prior occasion on which the General Assembly has requested an advisory opinion, Resolution 63/3 was adopted not in connection with a substantive agenda item for the General Assembly‘s work, but rather, only under an ad hoc agenda item created for the sole purpose of requesting an advisory opinion from the Court.59
37. Ironically, the member state who sponsored the referral of this narrow question has avowed that the Court‘s answer will not change even its conduct. Serbia has repeatedly said that it will not recognize Kosovo ―at any cost, even in the event that the [Court‘s] decision is in favor of Pristina.‖60 But Mr. President, this Court has no obligation to issue advisory opinions that the moving state has already suggested it might ignore, that seek to reopen long-ended political negotiations that responsible U.N. officials have concluded are futile, or that seek to enlist the Court to unravel delicate political arrangements that have brought stability to a troubled region.
38. We therefore urge this Court to leave Kosovo‘s declaration undisturbed—either by refraining from issuing an opinion or by simply answering in the affirmative the question presented: whether Kosovo‘s declaration of independence accords with international law.61 As our written pleadings make clear, the Court may answer the question posed to it and opine that international law did not prohibit Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, without addressing other political situations or the complex issues of self-determination raised by a number of states in these proceedings.62
59 See U.S. Comments, pp. 11-12. 60 See ibid., p. 10. 61 See U.S. Statement, pp. 45-49; U.S. Comments, p. 10. 62 See U.S. Comments, pp. 21-23.
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39. But if the Court should find it necessary to examine Kosovo‘s declaration through the lens of self-determination, it should consider the unique legal and factual circumstances of this case, including the extensive Security Council attention given to Kosovo; the large-scale atrocities against the population of Kosovo that led to Rambouillet and the 1244 process; the U.N.‘s concern for the will of the people of Kosovo, their undivided territory and unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes; the lengthy history of Kosovo‘s autonomy; the participation of Kosovo‘s representatives in the internationally led political process; the commitment of the people of Kosovo in their declaration to respect prior Security Council resolutions and international law; and the decision by U.N. organs to leave undisturbed Kosovo‘s move to independence.63 40. Mr. President: In its presentation yesterday, Cyprus pointedly sought to analogize the 1244 process to the heart-wrenching, but misleading, case where a parent sends a small child off to state supervision, only to lose her forever. But upon reflection, the far better analogy would be to acknowledge the futility of the state forcing an adult child to return to an abusive home against her will, particularly where parent and child have already long lived apart, and where repeated efforts at reconciliation have reached impasse. There, as here, declaring independence would be the only viable option, and would certainly be in accordance with law. IV. Conclusion
41. In conclusion, Mr. President, Kosovo‘s declaration of independence has proven to be necessary and politically stabilizing. The 2008 declaration of independence, and the ensuing recognition of Kosovo by many nations, brought much-needed stability to the Balkans and
63 See ibid., p. 21-23.
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closed the books on the protracted break-up of what once was Yugoslavia.64 Kosovo‘s declaration of independence emanated from a process supervised by the United Nations, which through Resolution 1244 and the institutions it established, was deeply involved in Kosovo‘s past and present. And the declaration has now made possible a future in which Kosovo is not merely independent politically, but also self-sufficient economically, administratively, and civilly.
42. Although Serbia, acting through the General Assembly, has urged this Court to issue an advisory opinion it hopes will reopen status negotiations to re-determine Kosovo‘s future, it has given this Court no reason to upend what has become a stable equilibrium. For Kosovo is now independent. Both Kosovo and Serbia are part of Europe‘s future. As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, this Court should not be conscripted into a member state‘s effort to roll back the clock nearly a decade, undoing a careful process accomplished under Resolution 1244 and overseen by so many other United Nations bodies.65 At a time when Kosovo‘s independence has finally closed one of the most painful chapters of modern European history, this Court should not use its advisory jurisdiction to reopen that chapter. Instead, we should all look to a common future in which both Serbia and an independent Kosovo have vitally important roles to play. 43. Mr. President, Honorable members of the Court: on behalf of my country, I thank you all for your thoughtful attention.
64 See ibid., p. 3. 65 See ibid.

1659-2009

Act of Abjuration, 1581(Dutch Declaration of Independence)

The States General of the United Provinces of the Low Countries, to all whom it may concern, do by these Presents send greeting:

As it is apparent to all that a prince is constituted by God to be ruler of a people, to defend them from oppression and violence as the shepherd his sheep; and whereas God did not create the people slaves to their prince, to obey his commands, whether right or wrong, but rather the prince for the sake of the subjects (without which he could be no prince), to govern them according to equity, to love and support them as a father his children or a shepherd his flock, and even at the hazard of life to defend and preserve them. And when he does not behave thus, but, on the contrary, oppresses them, seeking opportunities to infringe their ancient customs and privileges, exacting from them slavish compliance, then he is no longer a prince, but a tyrant, and the subjects are to consider him in no other view. And particularly when this is done deliberately, unauthorized by the states, they may not only disallow his authority, but legally proceed to the choice of another prince for their defense. This is the only method left for subjects whose humble petitions and remonstrances could never soften their prince or dissuade him from his tyrannical proceedings; and this is what the law of nature dictates for the defense of liberty, which we ought to transmit to posterity, even at the hazard of our lives. And this we have seen done frequently in several countries upon the like occasion, whereof there are notorious instances, and more justifiable in our land, which has been always governed according to their ancient privileges, which are expressed in the oath taken by the prince at his admission to the government; for most of the Provinces receive their prince upon certain conditions, which he swears to maintain, which, if the prince violates, he is no longer sovereign.

Now thus it was that the king of Spain after the demise of the emperor, his father, Charles the Fifth, of the glorious memory (of whom he received all these provinces), forgetting the services done by the subjects of these countries, both to his father and himself, by whose valor he got so glorious and memorable victories over his enemies that his name and power became famous and dreaded over all the world, forgetting also the advice of his said imperial majesty, made to him before to the contrary, did rather hearken to the counsel of those Spaniards about him, who had conceived a secret hatred to this land and to its liberty, because they could not enjoy posts of honor and high employments here under the states as in Naples, Sicily, Milan and the Indies, and other countries under the king's dominion. Thus allured by the riches of the said provinces, wherewith many of them were well acquainted, the said counselors, we say, or the principal of them, frequently remonstrated to the king that it was more for his Majesty's reputation and grandeur to subdue the Low Countries a second time, and to make himself absolute (by which they mean to tyrannize at pleasure), than to govern according to the restrictions he had accepted, and at his admission sworn to observe. From that time forward the king of Spain, following these evil counselors, sought by all means possible to reduce this country (stripping them of their ancient privileges) to slavery, under the government of Spaniards having first, under the mask of religion, endeavored to settle new bishops in the largest and principal cities, endowing and incorporating them with the richest abbeys, assigning to each bishop nine canons to assist him as counselors, three whereof should superintend the inquisition.

By this incorporation the said bishops (who might be strangers as well as natives) would have had the first place and vote in the assembly of the states, and always the prince's creatures at devotion; and by the addition of the said canons he would have introduced the Spanish inquisition, which has been always as dreadful and detested in these provinces as the worst of slavery, as is well known, in so much that his imperial majesty, having once before proposed it to these states, and upon whose remonstrances did desist, and entirely gave it up, hereby giving proof of the great affection he had for his subjects. But, notwithstanding the many remonstrances made to the king both by the provinces and particular towns, in writing as well as by some principal lords by word of mouth; and, namely, by the Baron of Montigny and Earl of Egmont, who with the approbation of the Duchess of Parma, then governess of the Low Countries, by the advice of the council of state were sent several times to Spain upon this affair. And, although the king had by fair words given them grounds to hope that their request should be complied with, yet by his letters he ordered the contrary, soon after expressly commanding, upon pain of his displeasure, to admit the new bishops immediately, and put them in possession of their bishoprics and incorporated abbeys, to hold the court of the inquisition in the places where it had been before, to obey and follow the decrees and ordinances of the Council of Trent, which in many articles are destructive of the privileges of the country.

This being come to the knowledge of the people gave just occasion to great uneasiness and clamor among them, and lessened that good affection they had always borne toward the king and his predecessors. And, especially, seeing that he did not only seek to tyrannize over their persons and estates, but also over their consciences, for which they believed themselves accountable to God only. Upon this occasion the chief of the nobility in compassion to the poor people, in the year 1566, exhibited a certain remonstrance in form of a petition, humbly praying, in order to appease them and prevent public disturbances, that it would please his majesty (by showing that clemency due from a good prince to his people) to soften the said points, and especially with regard to the rigorous inquisition, and capital punishments for matters of religion. And to inform the king of this affair in a more solemn manner, and to represent to him how necessary it was for the peace and prosperity of the public to remove the aforesaid innovations, and moderate the severity of his declarations published concerning divine worship, the Marquis de Berghen, and the aforesaid Baron of Montigny had been sent, at the request of the said lady regent, council of state, and of the states-general as ambassadors to Spain, where the king, instead of giving them audience, and redress the grievances they had complained of (which for want of a timely remedy did always appear in their evil consequences among the common people), did, by the advice of Spanish council, declare all those who were concerned in preparing the said remonstrance to be rebels, and guilty of high treason, and to be punished with death, and confiscation of their estates; and, what is more (thinking himself well assured of reducing these countries under absolute tyranny by the army of the Duke of Alva), did soon after imprison and put to death the said lords the ambassadors, and confiscated their estates, contrary to the law of nations, which has been always religiously observed even among the most tyrannic and barbarous princes.

And, although the said disturbances, which in the year 1566 happened on the aforementioned occasion, were now appeased by the governess and her ministers, and many friends to liberty were either banished or subdued, in so much that the king had not any show of reason to use arms and violence, and further oppress this country, yet for these causes and reasons, long time before sought by the council of Spain (as appears by intercepted letters from the Spanish ambassador, Alana, then in France, writ to the Duchess of Parma), to annul all the privileges of this country, and govern it tyrannically at pleasure as in the Indies; and in their new conquests he has, at the instigation of the council of Spain, showing the little regard he had for his people, so contrary to the duty which a good prince owes to his subjects), sent the Duke of Alva with a powerful army to oppress this land, who for his inhuman cruelties is looked upon as one of its greatest enemies, accompanied with counselors too like himself. And, although he came in without the least opposition, and was received by the poor subjects with all marks of honor and clemency, which the king had often hypocritically promised in his letters, and that himself intended to come in person to give orders to their general satisfaction, having since the departure of the Duke of Alva equipped a fleet to carry him from Spain, and another in Zealand to come to meet him at the great expense of the country, the better to deceive his subjects, and allure them into the toils, nevertheless the said duke, immediately after his arrival (though a stranger, and no way related to the royal family), declared that he had a captain-general's commission, and soon after that of governor of these provinces, contrary to all its ancient customs and privileges; and, the more to manifest his designs, he immediately garrisoned the principal towns and castles, and caused fortresses and citadels to be built in the great cities to awe them into subjection, and very courteously sent for the chief nobility in the king's name, under pretense of taking their advice, and to employ them in the service of their country. And those who believed his letters were seized and carried out of Brabant, contrary to law, where they were imprisoned and prosecuted as criminals before him who had no right, nor could be a competent judge; and at last he, without hearing their defense at large, sentenced them to death, which was publicly and ignominiously executed.

The others, better acquainted with Spanish hypocrisy, residing in foreign countries, were declared outlawed, and had their estates confiscated, so that the poor subjects could make no use of their fortresses nor be assisted by their princes in defense of their liberty against the violence of the pope; besides a great number of other gentlemen and substantial citizens, some of whom were executed, and others banished that their estates might be confiscated, plaguing the other honest inhabitants, not only by the injuries done to their wives, children and estates by the Spanish soldiers lodged in their houses, as likewise by diverse contributions, which they were forced to pay toward building citadels and new fortifications of towns even to their own ruin, besides the taxes of the hundredth, twentieth, and tenth penny, to pay both the foreign and those raised in the country, to be employed against their fellow-citizens and against those who at the hazard of their lives defended their liberties. In order to impoverish the subjects, and to incapacitate them to hinder his design, and that he might with more ease execute the instructions received in Spain, to treat these countries as new conquests, he began to alter the course of justice after the Spanish mode, directly contrary to our privileges; and, imagining at last he had nothing more to fear, he endeavored by main force to settle a tax called the tenth penny on merchandise and manufacture, to the total ruin of these countries, the prosperity of which depends upon a flourishing trade, notwithstanding frequent remonstrances, not by a single province only, but by all of them united, which he had effected, had it not been for the Prince of Orange with diverse gentlemen and other inhabitants, who had followed this prince in his exile, most of whom were in his pay, and banished by the Duke of Alva with others who between him and the states of all the provinces, on the contrary sought, by all possible promises made to the colonels already at his devotion, to gain the German troops, who were then garrisoned in the principal fortresses and the cities, that by their assistance he might master them, as he had gained many of them already, and held them attached to his interest in order, by their assistance, to force those who would not join with him in making war against the Prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, more cruel and bloody than any war before. But, as no disguises can long conceal our intentions, this project was discovered before it could be executed; and he, unable to perform his promises, and instead of that peace so much boasted of at his arrival a new war kindled, not yet extinguished.

All these considerations give us more than sufficient reason to renounce the King of Spain, and seek some other powerful and more gracious prince to take us under his protection; and, more especially, as these countries have been for these twenty years abandoned to disturbance and oppression by their king, during which time the inhabitants were not treated as subjects, but enemies, enslaved forcibly by their own governors.

Having also, after the decease of Don Juan, sufficiently declared by the Baron de Selles that he would not allow the pacification of Ghent, the which Don Juan had in his majesty's name sworn to maintain, but daily proposing new terms of agreement less advantageous. Notwithstanding these discouragements we used all possible means, by petitions in writing, and the good offices of the greatest princes in Christendom, to be reconciled to our king, having lastly maintained for a long time our deputies at the Congress of Cologne, hoping that the intercession of his imperial majesty and of the electors would procure an honorable and lasting peace, and some degree of liberty, particularly relating to religion (which chiefly concerns God and our own consciences), at last we found by experience that nothing would be obtained of the king by prayers and treaties, which latter he made use of to divide and weaken the provinces, that he might the easier execute his plan rigorously, by subduing them one by one, which afterwards plainly appeared by certain proclamations and proscriptions published by the king's orders, by virtue of which we and all officers of the United Provinces with all our friends are declared rebels and as such to have forfeited our lives and estates. Thus, by rendering us odious to all, he might interrupt our commerce, likewise reducing us to despair, offering a great sum to any that would assassinate the Prince of Orange.

So, having no hope of reconciliation, and finding no other remedy, we have, agreeable to the law of nature in our own defense, and for maintaining the rights, privileges, and liberties of our countrymen, wives, and children, and latest posterity from being enslaved by the Spaniards, been constrained to renounce allegiance to the King of Spain, and pursue such methods as appear to us most likely to secure our ancient liberties and privileges. Know all men by these presents that being reduced to the last extremity, as above mentioned, we have unanimously and deliberately declared, and do by these presents declare, that the King of Spain has forfeited, ipso jure, all hereditary right to the sovereignty of those countries, and are determined from henceforward not to acknowledge his sovereignty or jurisdiction, nor any act of his relating to the domains of the Low Countries, nor make use of his name as prince, nor suffer others to do it. In consequence whereof we also declare all officers, judges, lords, gentlemen, vassals, and all other the inhabitants of this country of what condition or quality soever, to be henceforth discharged from all oaths and obligations whatsoever made to the King of Spain as sovereign of those countries. And whereas, upon the motives already mentioned, the greater part of the United Provinces have, by common consent of their members, submitted to the government and sovereignty of the illustrious Prince and Duke of Anjou, upon certain conditions stipulated with his highness, and whereas the most serene Archduke Matthias has resigned the government of these countries with our approbation, we command and order all justiciaries, officers, and all whom it may concern, not to make use of the name, titles, great or privy seal of the King of Spain from henceforward; but in lieu of them, as long as his highness the Duke of Anjou is absent upon urgent affairs relating to the welfare of these countries, having so agreed with his highness or otherwise, they shall provisionally use the name and title of the President and Council of the Province.

And, until such a president and counselors shall be nominated, assembled, and act in that capacity, they shall act in our name, except that in Holland and Zealand where they shall use the name of the Prince of Orange, and of the states of the said provinces until the aforesaid council shall legally sit, and then shall conform to the directions of that council agreeable to the contract made with his highness. And, instead of the king's seal aforesaid, they shall make use of our great seal, center-seal, and signet, in affairs relating to the public, according as the said council shall from time to time be authorized. And in affairs concerning the administration of justice, and transactions peculiar to each province, the provincial council and other councils of that country shall use respectively the name, title, and seal of the said province, where the case is to be tried, and no other, on pain of having all letters, documents, and despatches annulled. And, for the better and effectual performance hereof, we have ordered and commanded, and do hereby order and command, that all the seals of the King of Spain which are in these United Provinces shall immediately, upon the publication of these presents, be delivered to the estate of each province respectively, or to such persons as by the said estates shall be authorized and appointed, upon peril of discretionary punishment.

Moreover, we order and command that from henceforth no money coined shall be stamped with the name, title, or arms of the King of Spain in any of these United Provinces, but that all new gold and silver pieces, with their halfs and quarters, shall only bear such impressions as the states shall direct. We order likewise and command the president and other lords of the privy council, and all other chancellors, presidents, accountants-general, and to others in all the chambers of accounts respectively in these said countries, and likewise to all other judges and officers, as we hold them discharged from henceforth of their oath made to the King of Spain, pursuant to the tenor of their commission, that they shall take a new oath to the states of that country on whose jurisdiction they depend, or to commissaries appointed by them, to be true to us against the King of Spain and all his adherents, according to the formula of words prepared by the states-general for that purpose. And we shall give to the said counselors, justiciaries, and officers employed in these provinces, who have contracted in our name with his highness the Duke of Anjou, an act to continue them in their respective offices, instead of new commissions, a clause annulling the former provisionally until the arrival of his highness. Moreover, to all such counselors, accomptants, justiciaries, and officers in these Provinces, who have not contracted with his highness, aforesaid, we shall grant new commissions under our hands and seals, unless any of the said officers are accused and convicted of having acted under their former commissions against the liberties and privileges of this country or of other the like maladministration.

We farther command of the president and members of the privy council, chancellor of the Duchy of Brabant, also the chancellor of the Duchy of Guelders, and county of Zutphen, to the president and members of the council of Holland, to the receivers of great officers of Beoostersheldt and Bewestersheldt in Zealand, to the president and council of Friese, and to the Escoulet of Mechelen, to the president and members of the council of Utrecht, and to all other justiciaries and officers whom it may concern, to the lieutenants all and every of them, to cause this our ordinance to be published and proclaimed throughout their respective jurisdictions, in the usual places appointed for that purpose, that none may plead ignorance. And to cause our said ordinance to be observed inviolably, punishing the offenders impartially and without delay; for so it is found expedient for the public good. And, for better maintaining all and every article hereof, we give to all and every one of you, by express command, full power and authority. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals, dated in our assembly at the Hague, the six and twentieth day of July, 1581, indorsed by the orders of the states-general, and signed J. De Asseliers.

President Heribert Barrera

El polític més lúcid de Catalunya, un cervell privilegiat, un patriota insubornable.
És un plaer sentir el seu català.